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Air Traffic Complexity as a Source 
of Risk in ATM
Tomislav Radišić, Petar Andraši, Doris Novak, Biljana Juričić 
and Bruno Antulov-Fantulin
Abstract
In this chapter the connection between air traffic complexity and risks in air 
traffic management system will be explored. Air traffic complexity is often defined 
as difficulty of controlling a traffic situation, and it is therefore one of the drivers 
for air traffic controller’s workload. With more workload, the probability of air 
traffic controller committing an error increases, so it is necessary to be able to assess 
and manage air traffic complexity. Here, we will give a brief overview of air traffic 
complexity assessment methods, and we will put the traffic complexity assess-
ment problem into a broader context of decision complexity. Human reliability 
assessment methods relevant to air traffic management will be presented and used 
to assess the risk of loss of separation in traffic situations with different levels of 
complexity. To determine the validity of the human reliability assessment method, 
an analysis of conflict risk will be made based on the real-time human-in-the-loop 
(HITL) simulations.
Keywords: air traffic complexity, risk, human reliability assessment,  
air traffic control, simulation
1. Introduction
Humans are at the core of every complex system in the world, and that is true for 
the air traffic management (ATM) system as well. While extremely resourceful and 
capable of dealing with unexpected circumstances, humans are also prone to errors. 
Although significant technological, organizational, operational, and other advances 
have been made in recent decades, catastrophic accidents driven by human errors 
are still a regular, albeit increasingly rare, occurrence. Recently, the realization that 
complete elimination of all human errors will probably never be achievable has 
took hold [1]. As with any system that requires high degree of safety, ATM system 
solves this issue by employing multiple levels of risk and safety management, each 
providing a layer of the safety net. Nevertheless, methods for reducing the human 
error are still widely used and being researched. These methods, which consider the 
effect of human error on risk and reliability, are generally classified under the name 
of human reliability analysis (HRA). This chapter explores the applicability of HRA 
as part of the overall risk assessment with a focus on air traffic complexity issues.
There are many motivations for performing a risk or reliability analysis. In most 
cases it is to reduce the potential for system failure caused by humans. In this case 
the risk analysis can be used either in the design process or during the operation. 
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Sometimes it is needed to change or restructure the organizational design in a 
manner which ensures at least the same level of safety as before. In other cases, risk 
analysis can be performed as a part of licensing arrangements where the operator 
is tasked with assuring that a system meets a safety target. Or it can be used during 
the decision-making process where an operator chooses one of the possible systems 
to procure. In many of these cases, HRA will be undertaken as part of the more 
comprehensive risk assessment process.
Air traffic controllers (ATCOs) are at the core of the ATM. They are the central 
node where most important safety-related tactical decisions are made. Their job is 
to gather information and process them with the goal of reaching solutions which 
ensure safe and cost-efficient air traffic. One of their main tasks is prioritization 
of actions because human mental capacity is limited and it has been shown that 
ATCOs frequently deal with information overload [2]. Previous research showed 
that overload usually causes performance decline [3]. Air traffic complexity is one 
of the main factors driving the increase in the ATCO workload, so it is a reasonable 
assumption that increased complexity will result in increased errors due to decay in 
ATCO performance. Therefore, it is important to be able to assess air traffic com-
plexity as a possible source factor of risk.
In this chapter, the connection between air traffic complexity, controller work-
load, HRA, and risk assessment will be made. For that purpose, in Section 2, a brief 
overview of complexity will be made, starting with definition and ending with 
assessment methods. In Section 3, a broader area of decision complexity and inher-
ent difficulty of making the correct decision in a complex system will be presented. 
In Section 4, a very brief overview of HRA methods relevant to ATM system will 
be presented, as well as an HRA method developed specifically for use in ATM. In 
the latter parts of Section 4, an example of how to include the air traffic complexity 
into the HRA will be shown, and, in comparison, risk analysis based on real-time 
human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulations will be presented.
2. Air traffic complexity
2.1 Definition and purpose
The Random House dictionary defines complexity as “the state or quality of 
being complex; intricacy”, and complex as “composed of many interconnected 
parts; compound; composite”, “characterized by a very complicated or involved 
arrangement of parts, units”, and “so complicated or intricate as to be hard to 
understand or deal with” [4]. While this example uses complicated to define complex, 
some other sources argue that there is a major difference between the two. Collins 
English Dictionary states that [5]:
Complex is properly used to say only that something consists of several parts. It 
should not be used to say that, because something consists of many parts, it is dif-
ficult to understand or analyze.
On the other hand, Cilliers, in his seminal book on the topic, claims exactly the 
opposite [6]:
If a system—despite the fact that it may consist of a huge number of compo-
nents—can be given a complete description in terms of its individual constituents, 
such a system is merely complicated. [...] In a complex system, on the other hand, 
the interaction among constituents of the system, and the interaction between the 
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system and its environment, are of such a nature that the system as a whole cannot 
be fully understood simply by analysing its components.
One example of such thinking is presented by Snowden in [7]. He claims that 
the aircraft can be considered complicated due to many parts. Once disassembled 
and analyzed, the function of all parts and their relationships can be determined. 
Human organizations and systems are, on the other hand, complex. They are made 
up of many interacting agents, with agent being any component of the system with 
identity. Agents can have multiple identities based on the context, i.e., a person 
can assume group identity or switch between formal and informal identities based 
on the environment. As these identities change, the components of the system 
change, the rules an agent follows change, and interactions between the compo-
nents change. This makes it impossible to distinguish between the cause and effect 
because they are intertwined [8].
In the context of air traffic control, complexity was rarely clearly defined, per-
haps due to assumed common knowledge. One notable exception is Meckiff (et al.) 
who stated that the air traffic complexity can be most easily defined as difficulty of 
monitoring and managing a specific air traffic situation [9]. It is intuitively clear that it 
is easier for the air traffic controller to monitor the airspace sector in which aircraft 
trajectories do not intersect and there are no level changes than the sector in which 
there are a lot of merging traffic flows and aircraft often change levels. As such, air 
traffic complexity could also be defined as a number of potential aircraft-aircraft 
and aircraft-environment interactions during a given time frame. Not all of these 
interactions require the same level of attention, urgency, or, ultimately, controller 
workload to resolve.
Complexity is not the same as traffic density. Obviously, the number of aircraft in 
a sector (also known as density, traffic load, or traffic count) directly influences the 
air traffic complexity. This number, however, is not the only indicator of the level of 
complexity, especially if one wishes to compare different sectors of airspace [10–12]. 
Two traffic situations can have equal density but vastly different complexity. Due to 
two different types of interactions, some researchers have chosen to make a distinc-
tion between airspace complexity (also static, structural) and air traffic com-
plexity (also dynamic, flow complexity [13]) which is influenced by the airspace 
complexity. This distinction will be used in this chapter as well. Unless explicitly 
stated, complexity will from now on refer exclusively to air traffic complexity.
Complexity is not a synonym for workload, although it has been proven multiple 
times that the increase in complexity results in increase in workload which in turn 
limits the airspace sector capacity [14, 15]. Mogford et al. [11] reviewed numerous 
research articles in search of complexity and workload relationship. They concluded 
that the complexity is actually a source factor for controller workload (Figure 1). 
However, complexity and workload are not directly linked. Their relationship is 
mediated by several other factors, such as equipment quality, individual differ-
ences, and controller cognitive strategies [11].
Controller cognitive strategies can be improved through training and experience 
that is readily seen when comparing experienced and inexperienced controllers. 
However, if one takes into consideration an average controller with average training, 
only two avenues to reduced controller workload remain—increasing equipment 
quality and decreasing complexity.
2.2 Previous research on air traffic complexity
Complexity was a common research topic since the early days of modern 
ATC operations. First papers that mention complexity were written in the early 
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1960s [16]. Since then, dozens of papers and reports were written on the topic of 
complexity—excellent reviews of those papers were written by Mogford [11] and 
Hilburn [17]. Instead of writing a completely new literature review, this chapter will 
present important research paths, ideas, methods, and facts, which are relevant to 
the present research.
It needs to be noted that most of the early research was conducted in order to 
better define factors that affect workload. Today, most of those factors, with pres-
ent understanding and definitions, would probably be called complexity factors. 
Some studies were nonempirical and lack exact definitions and measurement 
methods for complexity indicators. Those studies were excluded from this short 
review to give more room to those studies with experimentally validated complex-
ity factors.
Schmidt [18] approached the problem of modelling controller workload from 
the angle of observable controller actions. He created the control difficulty index, 
which can be calculated as a weighted sum of the expected frequency of occur-
rence of events that affect controller workload. Each event is given a different 
weight according to the time needed to execute a particular task. Though the author 
conducted extensive surveys to determine appropriate weights and frequencies for 
various events, this approach can only handle observable controller actions, which 
makes it very limiting.
Hurst and Rose [19], while not the first to realize the importance of traffic 
density, were first to measure the correlation of expert workload ratings with traffic 
density. They concluded that only 53% of the variance in reported workload ratings 
can be explained by density.
Stein [20] used Air Traffic Workload Input Technique (ATWIT), in which 
controllers report workload levels during simulation, to determine which of the 
workload factors influenced workload the most. Regression analysis proved that out 
of the five starting factors, four factors (localized traffic density, number of hand-
offs outbound, total amount of traffic, number of handoffs inbound) could explain 
67% of variance in ATWIT scores. This study showed the importance of localized 
traffic density which is a measure of traffic clustering. Technique similar to ATWIT 
will be used throughout the next three decades, including a modified ATWIT scores 
that will be used in this research.
Laudeman et al. [21] expanded on the notion of the traffic density by introduc-
ing dynamic density which they defined as a combination of “both traffic density 
(a count of aircraft in a volume of airspace) and traffic complexity (a measure of 
the complexity of the air traffic in a volume of airspace).” Authors used informal 
interviews with controllers to obtain a list of eight complexity factors to be used in 
Figure 1. 
The relationship between air traffic complexity and workload.
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dynamic density equation. The only criterion was that the factors could be calcu-
lated from the radar tracks or their extrapolations. The intention was to obtain an 
objective measure of controller workload based on the actual traffic. Their results 
showed that the dynamic density was able to account for 55% of controller activ-
ity variation. Three other teams [13, 22, 23] working under the Dynamic Density 
program developed additional 35 complexity indicators (factors), which were 
later successfully validated as a group by Kopardekar et al. [24]. Unfortunately, 
it was later shown that the complexity indicator weights were not universal to all 
airspace sectors, i.e., they had to be adjusted on a sector-by-sector basis [25]. This 
shortcoming, while making the dynamic density technique difficult to implement 
for operational purposes, has no influence if one wishes to compare two concepts of 
operations under similar conditions (similar sector configuration). Furthermore, 
same authors [24] suggested that, due to possibly nonlinear interactions between 
complexity factors, the dynamic density performance could be improved by using 
nonlinear techniques such as nonlinear regression, genetic algorithms, and neural 
networks.
Almost the same group of authors will use multiple linear regression method 
5 years later to determine which subset of complexity indicators will correlate well 
with the controller’s subjective complexity ratings [26]. After extensive simulator 
validation, results of this study showed that there are 17 complexity indicators that 
are statistically significant. Top five complexity indicators were sector count, sector 
volume, number of aircraft under 8 NM from each other, convergence angle, and 
standard deviation of ground speed/mean ground speed. Similar work was done 
by Masalonis et al. [27] who selected a subset of 12 indicators and Klein et al. [28] 
who selected a subset of only 7 complexity indicators, though with less extensive 
experimental validation.
In a similar vein, Bloem et al. [29] tried to determine which of the complexity 
indicators had the greatest predictive power in terms of future complexity. The 
authors concluded that there is a significant difference in predictive power of dif-
ferent complexity indicators. To complicate the matter further, they concluded that 
the subset of the complexity indicators that had the best predictive power changed 
depending on the prediction horizon.
To calculate potential impact of air traffic complexity on workload and costs, 
in 2000 the EUROCONTROL has given the same set of traffic data to UK National 
Air Traffic Services (NATS) and the EUROCONTROL Experimental Centre (EEC) 
with a task of independently devising a method of measuring the level of service 
[30]. While NATS has estimated ATS output (the service provided), the EEC has 
estimated the ATS workload needed to deliver the service. Both “were found to 
produce reasonably consistent results,” with an additional note that further analysis 
should be done before the final parameters for determining ATS provider costs are 
established. By 2006 EUROCONTROL’s Performance Review Commission finalized 
the complexity indicators to be used for ANSP benchmarking [31]. For this method 
the European airspace is divided into 20 NM X 20 NM X 3000 ft. cells, and for each 
cell the duration of potential interactions is calculated. Aircraft are “interacting” if 
they are in the same cell at the same time. The ratio of the hours of interactions and 
flight hours is the so-called adjusted density. In addition, the “structural index” is 
calculated as a sum of potential vertical, horizontal, and speed interactions. The 
final complexity score is calculated as a product of adjusted density and structural 
index. All in all, only four complexity indicators are used for this analysis, and no 
validation of any sort was presented in the report. It was noted, however, that shift-
ing the starting position of the grid by 7 NM caused the ANSP ranking to change 
dramatically (up to 16 places in an extreme case). Nonetheless, this method is still 
used for ANSP benchmarking.
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First to consider measuring complexity during TBO were Prevot and Lee [32]. 
They coined the term trajectory-based complexity (TBX) which is a measure 
of complexity in TBO. The basis of the TBX calculation is a set of nominal 
 conditions—nominal sector size, nominal number of transitioning aircraft, and a 
nominal equipage mix. Any difference to nominal operations causes a modification 
to the TBX value. Authors do not explain the method to determine the nominal 
conditions except that they can “be defined through knowledge elicitation sessions 
on a sector by sector basis or based upon more generic attributes.” The TBX value is 
then a number of aircraft that would produce the same workload under the nominal 
conditions as do aircraft under real conditions (e.g., the TBX of 20 means that the 
workload is equal to the aircraft count of 20 under nominal conditions even though 
there are actually only 16 aircraft in the sector). The advantage of this method is 
that it gives a single complexity value that can be easily related to aircraft count and 
is thus very user-friendly and self-explanatory (unlike many other complexity met-
rics). However, this study included only six complexity indicators with weights that 
were determined in an ad hoc manner and hardly any validation with actual subjec-
tive complexity. Only one of those complexity indicators was indirectly related to 
TBO (number of aircraft with data-link). Many human-in-the-loop simulation runs 
were performed in which the controllers had to give workload scores which were 
then compared with TBX value and simple aircraft count. While the authors claim 
that the subjective workload score correlated better with the TBX value, there was 
no objective correlation assessment presented. Finally, the authors have not com-
pared the effect of fraction of TBO aircraft on air traffic complexity.
In a subsequent paper by same authors, the relationship between workload and 
data-link equipage levels was explored [33]. It was concluded that the workload 
ratings correlated much better with the TBX score than with the aircraft count for 
varying data-link equipage levels.
Prandini et al. have developed a new method of mapping complexity based 
exclusively on traffic density [34]. This method is applicable only to the future 
concept of aircraft self-separation and does not take into account the human factors 
at all.
Gianazza [35–37] proposed a method for prediction of air traffic complex-
ity using tree search methods and neural networks. This method is based on the 
assumption that the air traffic complexity in historic flight data increased prior to 
the splitting of the collapsed sector into two smaller ones and decreased prior to 
collapsing the sectors into a larger one. The neural network was trained using this 
historical data, and then it could predict future increase in air traffic complexity. 
Tree search method was then used to determine the airspace configuration which 
yields lowest workload and complexity for the given air traffic pattern.
Lee et al. [38] have proposed that airspace complexity can be described in 
terms of how the airspace (together with the traffic inside it and the traffic control 
method) responds to disturbances. The effect of disturbances on control activ-
ity needed to accommodate that disturbance is what defines complexity in their 
opinion. The more control activity needed, the more complex the airspace is. They 
propose a tool, airspace complexity map, which should help to plan the airspace 
configuration and the future development of ATM.
In Radišić et al. [39], authors used domain-expert assessment to test the effect 
of the trajectory-based operations (TBO) on air traffic complexity. ATCOs were 
recruited to perform human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulations during which they 
were asked to provide real-time assessment of air traffic complexity. Linear regres-
sion model was used to select, among 20 most used complexity indicators, those 
indicators which correlated best with subjective complexity scores. Six indicators 
were used to generate a predictive linear model that performed well in conventional 
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operations but less so under TBO. Therefore, the authors defined and experimentally 
validated two novel TBO-specific complexity indicators. A second correlation model 
combining these two novel indicators with four already in use generated much better 
predictions of complexity than the first model. Nonetheless, the best correlation that 
was achieved was R = 0.83 (R2-adjusted = 0.691). In subsequent work, the authors 
attempted to achieve better prediction by using artificial neural networks; however, 
similar results were obtained. This indicates that there is some variation in subjective 
complexity scores provided by ATCOs that cannot be explained by traffic properties. 
Indeed, it might be the case that ATCOs introduce a degree of noise into the com-
plexity scores due to difficulty of maintaining the consistent scoring criteria [40].
Wang et al. [41] in their work used network approach to calculate air traffic 
complexity based on historical radar data. Their assumption is that air traffic 
situation is essentially a time-evolving complex system. In that system aircraft are 
key waypoints; route segments are nodes; aircraft-aircraft, aircraft-keypoint, and 
aircraft-segment complexity relationships are edges; and the intensities of vari-
ous complexity relationships are weights. The system was built using a dynamic 
weighted network model.
Xue et al. [42] in their work analyzed three complexity indicators for simulated 
UAS traffic: number of potential conflicts, scenario complexity metric, and number 
of flights. Scenario complexity metric is based on cost of pairwise conflict which 
is defined as deviation from the original path. To perform analysis on around 
1000 scenarios at different density levels, authors had to develop a UAS simulator. 
Analysis was done using Pearson and ACE statistics methods.
Future concept of operations will involve usage of far wider range of air traffic 
controller tools; therefore, it is expected that new complexity indicators related to 
interaction of controllers and equipment will have to be developed. Furthermore, 
novel complexity assessment methods are needed due to limits of current 
techniques.
2.3 Complexity estimation methods
In this section, several air traffic complexity estimation methods will be exam-
ined in greater detail. All complexity estimation methods are based on the traffic 
data which describes a traffic situation. Since the complexity is a psychological 
construct, the most relevant estimator of complexity in a given traffic situation is 
the air traffic controller. The air traffic controller can look at the traffic data and 
decide whether a traffic situation is complex or not. All other methods are just 
attempts at approximating the level of complexity as estimated by the controller. 
The main problem with expert-based estimation is the inconsistency between con-
trollers, where one controller gives a different complexity estimate than the other. 
Therefore, most other methods seek ways to make the complexity estimate without 
human input. Ideally, those other methods would be validated by comparing them 
to the expert, i.e., controller’s estimate; however, this is not always the case.
Three main methods of control-based (i.e., based on ATCOs’ experience of 
complexity as a driver for workload and, subsequently, limiting factor of airspace 
capacity) air traffic complexity estimation will be presented here:
• Expert-based air traffic complexity estimation—where an expert, in most 
cases an air traffic controller, gives their estimate of the complexity
• Indicator-based air traffic complexity estimation—where the values of com-
plexity indicators, derived from traffic data, are used to determine the level of 
complexity
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• Interaction-based air traffic complexity estimation—where the complexity is 
estimated on the basis of the number of aircraft interactions in a given airspace 
cell (this method could be broadly defined as a very narrow indicator-based 
complexity estimation method due to a very low number of indicators)
• Others—methods based on other principles, such as counting the number 
of clearances [43], evaluating proximity based on probabilistic occupancy of 
airspace [44], measuring sensitivity to initial conditions of the underlying 
dynamic system called Lyapunov exponents (i.e., assessing predictability of 
traffic) [45], and many others
3. ATC operations and the decision domains
The decision-making process needs to be adapted to the context in which the 
operations take place. It is often seen that one kind of decision-making, completely 
adapted to its environment and therefore useful, cannot be easily transferred to 
another environment. This is often the case with accomplished engineers being 
notably less successful after moving into the managerial role.
Classification of such environments and appropriate decision-making modes is 
sometimes attempted with the goal of making rules about the best ways to manage 
each context. However, this is not an exact science because there are multiple factors 
that can change the decision-making context depending on who the person making 
the decision is, or how experienced they are. Nevertheless, there is still utility in 
being aware of the environment in terms of decision contexts and learning how to 
detect when the environment shifts from one domain to another.
One such classification attempt is the Cynefin framework [7]. It was developed in 
the early 2000s as a tool for decision-making, and it proposes five decision domains:
• Simple (also, obvious)—In this domain the situation is well known and 
stable. The cause–effect relations are established and rarely change. Following 
procedures and best practices is the best course of action to ensure efficient 
realization of goals. Decision-making process is usually made of the sense-
categorize-respond steps. A major issue in this domain is the overreliance 
on patterns and routine behavior which stifles innovation and precludes any 
change. This has caused many issues in the past when organizations were not 
willing to adapt to changes or innovate, but on the other hand, this has also 
created many opportunities for disruption by newcomers.
• Knowable (also, complicated)—This domain includes environments in which 
not everything is known but everything can be understood with enough 
time and effort. In knowable domain the experts can work rationally towards 
solutions by sensing the environment, analyzing the data, and applying the 
best practices. In contrast with simple domain, where the main part of the task 
is applying the best practices, in knowable domain most of the effort is spent 
analyzing the situation.
• Complex—In this domain are environments or systems which cannot be ana-
lyzed by breaking them down into smaller pieces, analyzing them individually, 
and creating the big picture based on the analysis of individual components. 
The very act of interacting with the system introduces changes which cannot 
always be predicted. The main mode of management of complex systems is 
through observation of patterns, finding ways to sustain those patterns we 
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desire, and disrupting those we do not. One particular phenomenon that arises 
in complex systems is the so-called retrospective coherence. The state of the 
system seems logical and coherent once it is retrospectively analyzed; however, 
current state of the system could hardly be anticipated in advance because 
there are many other equally plausible system states.
• Chaotic—Chaotic systems cannot be analyzed for cause and effect relation-
ships. Patterns are not visible, and if one waits for patterns to emerge, the dam-
age could become disastrous. It is in these conditions that the system is most 
difficult to manage but also most capable of change, for better or for worse.
Air traffic control is all about making decisions, so it is not a novel idea to apply 
the Cynefin framework to the ATC operations even though Cynefin was originally 
proposed for business-related decision-making [46]. Air traffic control is a complex 
system with numerous human and machine agents, organized in deep layers of 
components glued by multiple communication modes and protocols. This is even 
more apparent in air traffic management systems. Although someone might look at 
the routine ATC operations and consider them simple, or even mechanistic, such 
thinking is a sure way towards probably costly failure. In our opinion, ATC opera-
tions can be assigned to all domains depending on the traffic situation or changes in 
states of the system:
• During the nominal low-traffic ATC operations, the traffic situation is easy 
enough in terms of workload to be considered as belonging to the simple 
domain. The ATCO needs to sense the traffic situation or a particular part of it, 
usually by looking at the radar screen and talking to the pilots. Then they need 
to categorize the task that needs to be performed in order to ensure safe and 
efficient traffic. The task can be categorized as any of the numerous routine 
ATC tasks, e.g., conflict resolution, clearing or initiating climbs or descents, 
managing exit flight level constraints, etc. Then the ATCO acts by issuing a 
command or a clearance. This process occurs many times an hour, and some 
parts of it are trained to such a degree that the ATCO is often not even con-
scious of them.
• In nominal high traffic ATC operations, the number of interactions rises and 
so does the difficulty of maintaining safe and efficient air traffic. The situ-
ation needs to be sensed and then analyzed for all the tasks that need to be 
performed. Tasks are often prioritized based on the urgency and difficulty. A 
lot more time is spent on this analysis than in low-traffic situation. The ATCO 
then solves the issues by applying solutions that are considered to be best prac-
tice. There are multiple ways of solving an issue, and all of them are correct 
if the safety is maintained and flight efficiency is not unreasonably reduced. 
Unless there is some source of major uncertainty present, such as adverse 
weather conditions, this type of operations is best described as belonging to 
the knowable domain.
• In off-nominal operations of any traffic level or nominal operations with a 
major source of uncertainty, such as adverse weather, the decision context 
often enters the complex domain. The traffic situation evolves into unpredict-
able directions which can be completely explained only post hoc. Systemic 
complexity management measures, such as regulations, are undertaken to 
ensure safety because continuing with business as usual could lead, with unac-
ceptable probability, to incidents or accidents. Nonetheless, these measures 
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are sometimes not enough or are compounded with additional issues which 
altogether cause the loss of situational awareness for the ATCO or the pilots. 
Incidents lurk in these conditions.
• Operations in the chaotic domain should never happen in ATC. The whole 
system is designed to prevent such occurrences. However, history has shown 
us that there are sequences of events that can throw the whole system into a 
disarray and shift the decision context very quickly from the simple into the 
chaotic domain. One example of such a sequence is Croatia Control’s area 
control center (ACC) outage of 2014 when flooding due to unprecedented 
rainfall combined with human error and organizational deficiencies caused 
the complete loss of power to all ATC systems for 2 h [47]. When radar screens 
went blank, quick-thinking ATCOs used their personal mobile phones to 
contact ACCs of neighboring countries to warn them of potential conflicts, 
thus preventing midair collisions. This incident clearly illustrates how quickly a 
situation can go from bad (complex domain, operations in adverse weather) to 
worse (chaotic domain, complete loss of power).
It should be noted here that air traffic complexity should not be confused with 
complex domain in the Cynefin framework. Air traffic complexity is present in all 
decision domains, usually being lower in the simple domain and higher at the other 
end of the spectrum in the chaotic domain.
The main purpose of this classification of decision contexts in ATC is to help 
make ATCOs and supervisors aware of the different environments that are possible 
behind the seemingly unchanging radar screen. Another purpose, which will be dis-
cussed in the next section of this chapter, is to lay down the framework for assessing 
risks associated with air traffic complexity.
4. Assessing risks associated with air traffic complexity
Complexity in ATM is often split into two parts: airspace complexity (static 
complexity) and air traffic complexity (dynamic complexity). It is generally agreed 
that both dynamic and static components of complexity can affect controller 
workload and influence the probability of occurrence of an ATC (i.e., controller) 
error. Dynamic complexity relates to the factors describing air traffic complexity, 
i.e., it can include factors such as traffic volume, climbing/descending traffic, mix 
of aircraft type, military area activity, and types of aircraft intersection. Static fac-
tors, on the other hand, encompass factors related to the airspace, such as airspace 
structure, proximity of reporting points to sector boundaries, and standing agree-
ments between ANSPs.
In a human factors study, areas rated as some of the biggest contributors to risk 
in ATM are workload, human error, allocation of function, and situational aware-
ness [48]. As mentioned previously, air traffic complexity is a measure of difficulty 
of controlling the air traffic in a given sector; therefore, it is a direct contributor to 
workload. In a sense, ATCO’s job is to make correct decisions, whereas air traffic 
complexity is a factor that makes the search for the right decision more difficult. 
Therefore, increased complexity can directly increase the probability of a wrong 
decision being made because the size of the search space increases faster than the 
set of correct solutions. Here lies the main connection between air traffic complex-
ity and risk. Probability of human error (i.e., human error risk) increases with 
increased complexity. Thus, it is reasonable to assess the complexity-related risks 
from the human reliability assessment point of view.
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EUROCONTROL investigated the possible relationship between ATM system 
complexity and safety. They tried to develop a complexity hazard and operability 
(HAZOP) technique with the main objective being to trial this approach and 
evaluate its utility for safety assessment and obtain feedback on its acceptability 
with operations personnel [49]. The attempt at developing complexity HAZOP was 
unsuccessful due to difficulty of adjusting the HAZOP technique to the complexity 
issues. Therefore, in this section only HRA methods will be presented.
4.1 Human reliability assessment
This section will provide a brief overview of the HRA methods and their 
development over the years; however, for a more thorough review of HRA methods, 
one can find more information in [46, 50]. Only those methods that are in some way 
relevant to HRA in aviation will be considered.
HRA can be defined as “any method by which human reliability is estimated” 
[51], and it is generally presented as having three main parts: (1) identifying pos-
sible human errors and contributors, (2) modelling human error, and (3) quantify-
ing human error probabilities. These methods were first developed in nuclear power 
safety systems.
In the early models of HRA, human was often considered as just another part 
of the system. For example, in [52], a technique for human error-rate prediction 
(THERP) was developed based on the techniques used in nuclear power plant risk 
management, i.e., a straightforward event tree analysis was performed. Each human 
action (e.g., reading a display, operating a lever) was given a human error probabil-
ity (HEP) as a probability with a value from 0 (least probable) to 1 (most probable). 
Sample of values for different errors can be seen in Table 1. The values assigned to 
each error type came from authors’ experience and from earlier studies performed 
in the defense sector.
THERP also specified performance shaping factors (PSF) which were used to 
modify the nominal HEPs based on the context of the action (e.g., time pressure, 
human-machine interface, etc.). A list of possible PSFs for one error is given in 
Table 2. One can notice that there are no error multipliers associated with each 
PSF. It is the duty of the assessor to define the maximum affect that each PSF could 
have on HEPs. Criticism of THERP was mostly that it was too difficult to apply 
because of quite detailed decomposition of tasks that it relied on a database of HEPs 
which was never really validated and that it took very broad and casual definitions 
of human performance factors.
Error HEP
Failure to perform rule-based actions correctly when written procedures are available and used 
(with recovery)
0.025
Inadvertent activation of a control; select wrong control on a panel from an array of similar-
appearing controls identified by labels only
0.003
Omitting a step or important instruction from a formal or ad hoc procedure 0.003
Omitting an item of instruction when use of written procedures is specified (<10 items) 0.001
Checking the status of equipment if that status affects one’s safety when performing his tasks 0.001
Turn rotary control in the wrong direction when there is no violation of populational stereotypes 0.0005
Errors of commission in check-reading analog meters with easily seen limit marks 0.001
Table 1. 
Examples of HEPs given in [52].
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Another version of this type of model was done in human error assessment 
and reduction technique (HEART) [53]. The database of HEPs was much smaller 
and more generic, so it was more flexible and easier to apply than THERP. Instead 
of highly detailed errors, the focus is on a handful of generic task types for which 
probabilities of failure are given (Table 3). This simplification has made the HEART 
technique much more accepted outside the nuclear power industry for which the 
THERP was designed.
The author has identified the human factors he found relevant by searching the 
human factors literature and assigned relative weights to them, identified impacts 
of errors, and suggested a set of human error data which should enable higher 
reliability of the system. Instead of calling them PSFs, the author called them error-
producing condition (EPC) and provided the multipliers for each. Multipliers are 
used to increase the nominal human unreliability in cases where there are circum-
stances that increase the probability of human error. Some of the EPCs are shown in 
Table 4.
More generic error types have led to confusion when trying to apply it to a spe-
cific industrial application. This problem was addressed by developing specialized 
versions of HEART for specific industries. One such derivative will be discussed 
shortly.
These models are characterized by defining two broad categories of errors: 
errors of omission (when human operator fails to make an action) and errors of 
commission (when operator makes a wrong action). These simplifications were 
later put, at least partially, into the context of actual human behavior which knows 
many other ways of committing an error. For example, [54, 55] included contextual 
effect such as stress, organizational culture, and tiredness into the model, whereas 
[56, 57] also included the possible variation in operator’s responses and recovery 
actions undertaken once the errors have been noticed. By taking into account the 
context of human behavior, these techniques have made a qualitative step forward 
in comparison to the THERP and HEART, so they are generally called second-
generation HRA techniques. This did not, however, improve their adoption in the 
industry because simpler and more flexible techniques, such as HEART, are more 
usable and sustainable. For this reason, the first HRA technique developed specifi-
cally for ATM was based on HEART technique. It was developed in 2008 and named 
Controller Action Reliability Assessment (CARA) [58].
4.2 Human reliability assessment in ATC
Compared to HEART, CARA’s generic task types were developed to better suit 
the needs of HRA in ATM (Table 5). To make sure that the task types are in line 
with the commonly used models of ATCO tasks, the basis for task development was 
1 Stress level of the operator
2 Rate at which the operator must process signals
3 Frequency with which a particular display is scanned
4 Whether a written checklist is used to direct the operator to specific displays
5 Relationship of the displays to annunciators or other attention-getting devices
6 Extent to which the information needed for operator decisions and actions is displayed directly
7 Human factors engineering related to the design and arrangement of the displays
Table 2. 
Examples of PSFs for errors related to reading unannunciated displays [52].
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found in EUROCONTROL’s studies. Literature and ergonomics database reviews 
were undertaken to find the data which supports new values of HEPs for each 
generic task type. Where more than one error probability for a given task was found 
in the literature or the databases, geometric mean was used to establish a single 
value. Furthermore, uncertainty bounds of each HEP were determined using the 
single sample t-test [59].
EPCs used in CARA were, like general task types, developed by adjusting EPCs 
from HEART and other techniques (most notably SPAR-H [60] and CREAM [61]). 
To ensure that the CARA EPCs closely follow the well-established contextual struc-
ture used in ATC, they were modelled to fit the Human Error in ATM (HERA) [62] 
classification structure. For initial consideration, CARA EPCs’ maximum affect 
Generic task Proposed 
nominal 
human 
unreliability
5th–95th 
percentile 
bounds
Totally unfamiliar, performed at speed with no real idea of likely 
consequences
0.55 0.35–0.97
Shift or restore system to a new or original state on a single attempt 
without supervision or procedures
0.26 0.14–0.42
Complex task requiring high level of comprehension and skill 0.16 0.12–0.28
Fairly simple task performed rapidly or given scant attention 0.09 0.06–0.13
Routine, highly practiced, rapid task involving relatively low level 
of skill
0.02 0.007–0.045
Completely familiar, well-designed, highly practiced, routine task 
occurring several times per hour, performed to highest possible 
standards by highly motivated, highly trained, and experienced 
person, totally aware of implications of failure, with time to correct 
potential error but without the benefit of significant job aids
0.0004 0.00008–
0.009
Respond correctly to system command even when there is an 
augmented or automated supervisory system providing accurate 
interpretation of system state
0.00002 0.000006–
0.0009
Table 3. 
Generic tasks and proposed human unreliability in HEART technique [53].
Error-producing condition Maximum predicted increase in 
unreliability when going from good 
conditions to bad
Unfamiliarity with a situation which is potentially important 
but which only occurs infrequently or which is novel
×17
A shortage of time available for error detection and correction ×11
A low signal-to-noise ratio ×10
A means of suppressing or overriding information or features 
which is too easily accessible
×9
No means of conveying spatial and functional information to 
operators in a form which they can readily assimilate
×8
A mismatch between an operator’s model of the world and 
that imagined by a designer
×8
Table 4. 
EPCs and their multipliers as proposed in the HEART technique [53].
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values were taken from HEART, SPAR-H, and CREAM by selecting the most similar 
EPCs and then picking the one with the highest value (Table 6). It is expected that 
with further refinement of underlying data, the maximum affect values will be 
adjusted to better suit the actual values in ATC.
For the first time here, one can see that the traffic complexity was taken into 
account (EPC 17) with maximum affect of 10. CARA User’s Manual provides addi-
tional information about this EPC, adding three anchor points for this EPC [63]:
• Higher than normal traffic levels with some non-routine conflicts to solve 
(EPC multiplier 0.1)
• Higher than normal traffic levels with some non-routine conflicts requiring 
constrained solutions; possibility of secondary conflicts (conflict resolution 
can lead to a second conflict) (EPC multiplier 0.5)
• High traffic levels with unusual patterns of traffic requiring problem solving 
and a number of future conflicts requiring resolution (EPC multiplier 1.0)
EPC multipliers are used to scale the EPC affect from its maximum value to 
the actual value for the situation that is being assessed, thus getting the actual 
Task context Generic task type HEP Uncertainty 
bounds
A. Offline tasks A. Offline tasks 0.03 —
B. Checking B1. Active search of radar or FPS, assuming 
some confusable information on display
0.005 0.002–0.02
B2. Respond to visual change in display (e.g., 
aircraft highlighted changes to low-lighted)
0.13 0.05–0.3
B3. Respond to unique and trusted audible and 
visual indication
0.0004 —
C. Monitoring 
for conflicts or 
unanticipated changes
C1. Identify routine conflict 0.01 Holding 
value’
C2. Identify unanticipated change in radar 
display (e.g., change in digital flight level due to 
aircraft deviation or corruption of datablock)
0.3 0.2–0.5
D. Solving conflicts D1. Solve conflict which includes some 
complexity. Note for very simple conflict 
resolution consider use of GTT F
0.01 Holding 
value’
D2. Complex and time pressured conflict 
solution (do not use time pressure EPC)
0.19 0.09–0.39
E. Plan aircraft in/out of 
sector
E. Plan aircraft in/out of sector 0.01 Holding 
value’
F. Manage routine traffic F. Routine element of sector management (e.g., 
rule-based selection of routine plan for an 
aircraft or omission of clearance)
0.003 Holding 
value’
G. Issuing instructions G1. Verbal slips 0.002 0.001–0.003
G2. Physical slips (two simple choices) 0.002 0.0008–
0.004
Holding values are to be updated once more data is available.
Table 5. 
Generic task types used in CARA technique [59].
15
Air Traffic Complexity as a Source of Risk in ATM
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.90310
effect (AE). As is the case with many HRA techniques, some expert opinion is 
needed here to determine where the assessed scenario falls on the scale of 0.1–1.0. 
An example of human error risk calculation is given in the next section.
4.3 Using CARA to assess the effect of complexity on ATCO error risk
To better show how CARA is used to assess the effect of complexity on ATCO 
error risk, a simple example will be used. In this example, we suppose that the 
ATCO is working on an en route sector with moderately high air traffic complexity. 
Weather is calm and there are no failures in any of the air or ground equipment. In 
these conditions, we might want to assess the probability that the ATCO will not 
notice a conflict.
HERA element CARA EPCs Maximum 
affect
Documentation/ 
procedures
1. Shortfalls in the quality of information conveyed by 
procedures
5
Training and experience 2. Unfamiliarity and adequacy of training/experience 20
3. On-the-job training 8
Workplace design/HMI 4. A need to unlearn a technique and apply one which 
requires the application of an opposing philosophy—
stereotype violation
24
5. Time pressure due to inadequate time to complete the task 11
6. Cognitive overload, particularly one caused by 
simultaneous presentation of non-redundant information
6
7. Poor, ambiguous, or ill-matched system feedback—general 
adequacy of the human-machine interface
5
8. Trust in system —
9. Little or no independent checking 3
10. Unreliable instrumentation 1.6
Environment 11. Environment—controller workplace noise/lighting issues, 
cockpit smoke
8
Personal factor issues 12. High emotional stress and effects of ill health 5
13. Low vigilance 3
Team factor issues 14. Difficulties caused by team coordination problems or 
friction between team members
10
15. Difficulties caused by poor shift hand-over practices 10
Pilot-controller 
communication
16. Communications quality —
Traffic and airspace 
issues
17. Traffic complexity 10
18. Unavailable equipment/degraded mode—weather issues —
Weather 19. Weather —
Non-HERA: 
organizational culture
20. Low workforce morale or adverse organizational 
environment
2
Non-HERA: cognitive 
style
21. Shift from anticipatory to reactive mode 10
22. Risk taking 4
Table 6. 
CARA EPCs and values of their maximum affect [59].
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To do this, we select a generic task type (GTT) that best suits our situation. 
Here, it is C1. Identify routine conflict with HEP of 0.01. Appropriate EPC to select 
in this case is the EPC 17: traffic complexity with maximum affect of 10. Also, we 
use our expertise to determine that the current traffic situation is moderately 
complex, so we use EPC multiplier to determine the assessed effect (AE) equal to 
0.4. Calculating the probability (P) of ATCO’s failure to detect the conflict is then 
calculated using Eqs. 1–3.
  P = GTT ×  ( (EPC − 1) × AE + 1) (1)
  P = 0.01 ×  ( (10 − 1) × 0.4 + 1) (2)
  P = 0.046 (3)
The result shows that the probability of ATCO failing to notice a conflict in a 
moderately complex situation is 0.046 or 4.6%. The −1 and +1 in Eq. 1 are added 
to ensure that the resulting EPC is more than 1 without needlessly increasing the 
EPC (e.g., if only the final +1 was added). Conversely, the probability of ATCO 
identifying a conflict is equal to 95.4%. These probabilities are valid for a situation 
with only one ATCO; however, en route ATC operations are usually performed with 
two ATCOs handling a sector (planning and executive ATCOs). The probability 
that both ATCOs will fail to notice the conflict is equal to 0.046 x 0.046 = 0.0021 
which is to say that approximately 1 in 500 conflicts in moderately complex traffic 
situations will not be identified (step 1 in Figure 2). Fortunately, ATC tools, such as 
short-term conflict alert (STCA), will sound the alarm in that case, and the ATCO 
will have the opportunity for a timely recovery.
This calculation showed how to use CARA to determine probability of a single 
event. Events can be chained into probability trees to calculate the probability of a 
sequence of events. Building on the previous example, we can calculate the prob-
abilities of further events after the conflict was identified or after a conflict was 
missed. First possibility, and a more probable one, is that the conflict was identified. 
Next step for ATCOs is to solve it. Let us assume that this task can be assigned to the 
D1. Solve conflict which includes some complexity GTT which is assigned HEP of 0.01. 
Using a GTT with the same HEP as in previous example, in combination with same 
EPC for traffic complexity, will yield the same error probability of 0.046 (step 2 in 
Figure 2). If ATCO notices that the conflict is not solved, they will make another 
attempt to solve it (step 3 in Figure 2). This can be considered a recovery action for 
the previous error (not solving the conflict). It is up to the assessor to analyze the 
traffic situation and operational procedures to determine how many attempts an 
ATCO could have before the STCA alarm rings. Modelling of additional tools, such 
as separation tool which helps ATCO to determine whether the conflict resolution 
action was successful or not, can assist the assessor in determining the most accu-
rate sequence of events.
If the conflict was missed or the ATCO could not solve it in time, STCA will 
sound the alarm. This usually occurs 2 min before the loss of separation. ATCOs’ 
response to the STCA can be modelled using the B3. Respond to unique and trusted 
audible and visual indication GTT which is assigned HEP of 0.0004. Due to short 
time until loss of separation, it is reasonable to use EPC number 5: time pressure 
due to inadequate time to complete the task which is assigned maximum affect value 
of 11. Since this GTT only relates to noticing and responding to the STCA, the 
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actual effect of this EPC will be on the lower side, so the multiplier is set to 0.2. 
Calculation of the error probability is then made with Eqs. 4–6.
  P = GTT ×  ( (EPC − 1) × AE + 1) (4)
  P = 0.0004 ×  ( (11 − 1) × 0.2 + 1) (5)
  P = 0.0012 (6)
This calculation shows that the probability of not noticing the STCA alarm 
will be 0.12% (step 4 in Figure 2). Once the ATCO notices the STCA, they will 
make another effort to solve the conflict. This time, the appropriate GTT is D2: 
complex and time pressured conflict solution which is assigned HEP value of 0.19 with 
confidence interval between 0.09 and 0.39. The assessor should use expert guid-
ance to determine which value should actually be used; in this example, 0.15 will 
be used. In addition, assessor could add two EPCs, one for time pressure ((5) time 
pressure due to inadequate time to complete the task) and one for complexity ((17) 
traffic complexity); however, CARA User Manual states that the EPC 5 should not be 
Figure 2. 
Probability tree for conflict resolution in moderately complex traffic according to CARA.
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combined with GTT D2 and neither should EPC 5 and 17 be used together [63]. This 
prevents overly pessimistic results. Therefore, only EPC 17 will be included in the 
assessment. Like in previous steps of this example, we will use 0.4 as EPC multiplier 
to determine the assessed effect. The calculation is given by Eqs. 7–9.
  P = GTT ×  ( (EPC − 1) × AE + 1) (7)
  P = 0.15 ×  ( (10 − 1) × 0.4 + 1) (8)
  P = 0.69 (9)
This calculation shows that, in complex traffic situation, the probability of a 
conflict not being solved under time pressure (STCA alarm) will be 69% (step 5 in 
Figure 2). In comparison, if the traffic is not complex, the probability of failure 
will be only 15%. Obviously, assessor should adjust the values of GTTs and EPCs to 
better suit the situation being assessed, so these probabilities are in no way final.
Finally, the probability of each outcome can be calculated by multiplying the 
probabilities of each event that led to that outcome. For example, if one wishes 
to calculate the probability that the conflict will be solved only after two failed 
attempts and an STCA alarm, step 5 in Figure 2, they should multiply probabilities 
of all events leading to that outcome as seen in Eqs. 10–12.
  P outcome =  P event1 ×  P event2 × … ×  P eventN (10)
  P outcome = 0.9979 × 0.046 × 0.046 × 0.9988 × 0.31 (11)
  P outcome = 6.5 ×  10 
−4 (12)
The last step in this process is to sum up all the probabilities of a favorable out-
come (conflict solved) versus all the probabilities of an unfavorable outcome (loss 
of separation). In this example, the probability of the favorable outcome is 99.71% 
versus the probability of an unfavorable outcome which is 0.29%.
To better appreciate the effect of traffic complexity on the risk of human error, 
comparison with the traffic situation which is not complex can be made by exclud-
ing the traffic complexity EPC from the calculation. This calculation is omitted 
here for brevity, but the same method without the traffic complexity EPCs yields 
probability of a loss of separation below 3.5 × 10−5 per conflict (approximately 1 in 
28,600 conflicts). That is two orders of magnitude less probable than in the case 
with moderate complexity (0.29% or 1 in 345). On the other hand, if the traffic is 
highly complex, the assessor might use higher EPC multiplier for complexity, all 
the way up to 1. In that case, the probability of an unfavorable outcome, i.e., loss 
of separation, is 2% (1 in 50) which is 7 times more probable than in the example 
above (Table 7).
4.4 Using simulations to assess the effect of traffic complexity on risk
In addition to CARA, another method for assessing risks related to air traffic 
complexity is by conducting simulations. Simulation is a core method for ATM 
research and training, with different purposes requiring different levels of fidelity 
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and simulation scope. Fidelity refers to the level of similarity between the simu-
lated environment and the actual operations. Simulation scope can be broadly 
divided into strategic and tactical simulations. Strategic simulation tools (e.g., 
EUROCONTROL’s NEST) are used to analyze current and forecast future ATM 
situation on a global level. On the other hand, tactical simulation tools are used 
to accurately simulate ATC operations on a sector level (e.g., ATCoach by UFA or 
Micronav’s BEST Radar Simulator) [64]. For studies involving human factors, tacti-
cal real-time human-in-the-loop simulations provide the most reliable results.
Most representative results are produced when the simulator satisfies these 
requirements:
• Realistic working environment
• Accurate and versatile aircraft models
• Representative ATC tool operation
• Built-in stochasticity
• Human voice communication
• Research-level data logging
• Suitable meteorological model
• Suitable system and sub-system failure modelling
We used HITL simulations to assess the effect of trajectory-based operations 
(TBO) on air traffic complexity; for more information about that study, see [39]. 
Here we will provide a brief description of the methodology used and additional 
analysis of human errors made during that experiment. This will enable comparison 
of the simulation with the results obtained from CARA.
4.4.1 Example of an HITL simulation methodology
Simulation scenarios were developed based on the actual flight data. To measure 
complexity in conventional and trajectory-based operations, each simulation sce-
nario had to be developed in three versions: conventional operations, 30% aircraft 
flying TBO, and 70% aircraft flying TBO.
Ten suitably experienced air traffic controllers were recruited to perform 
simulations. They all held professional air traffic controller licenses and had 
operational experience in Zagreb CTA Upper North sector (where the simulated 
traffic situations would take place). Before the actual experiment began, each 
controller received training in order to get accustomed with the simulator inter-
face and operational procedures (though they were designed to closely resemble 
Low complexity Moderate complexity High complexity
p(solved) 0.999965 0.9971 0.98
p(loss of separation) 0.000035 0.0029 0.02
Table 7. 
Comparison of probabilities to solve the conflict in traffic situations with different levels of complexity.
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their actual working environment). The training consisted of an introductory 
lecture, pre-simulator briefing, simulator runs, and post-simulator briefing. One 
pseudo-pilot was used for all simulation runs. The controller could communi-
cate with the pseudo-pilot only via voice communication (through headset) or 
data-link.
Each controller performed three scenarios for each of the three types of the 
operations, each corresponding to different traffic loads—low, medium, and high 
(9 runs in total). Low scenarios were modelled to represent off-peak traffic, medium 
scenarios to represent peak traffic, and high scenarios to represent future peak 
traffic loads with 15% higher peak traffic. To prevent order of simulation scenarios 
affecting results, each controller was randomly assigned order in which he or she 
will perform different versions of the scenario (conventional, 30% TBO, 70% TBO). 
The order in which scenarios with different traffic loads (low, medium, high) were 
performed was, however, fixed and known to ATCOs. This enabled controllers to 
assess complexity more consistently.
During each simulation run, a subjective complexity measurement (SCM) tool 
opened every 2 min, accompanied by nonintrusive aural notification. The tool 
consisted of seven buttons (1–7), and the controller had to click on the one which 
was closest to the perceived level of air traffic complexity. The controller’s complex-
ity assessment was time-stamped and stored.
In addition to the subjective complexity measurement scores, objective complex-
ity indicators were also calculated in real time, time-stamped, and stored. For the 
purpose of calculating new complexity indicators post-simulation, all aircraft states 
were stored for each time step of the simulation (1 s). Aircraft state included all 
data that pertained to the specific flight at that point in time (e.g., position, velocity, 
heading, mass, pitch, bank, throttle, drag, climb mode, acceleration mode, assigned 
flight level/speed/heading, route, etc.).
All other available information was also stored. Human-machine interactions 
were recorded in-application, while an additional application was used to record 
radar screen and voice communication.
4.4.2 Simulation results and comparison with CARA
Overall, 88 simulator runs were performed, each lasting for approximately 
50 min. Though it is very difficult to ascertain the number of potential and actual 
conflicts, the frequency of STCA alarms and loss of separation occurrences can 
be used to assess the risk that air traffic complexity introduces. Before going into 
further details, it must be noted that the probabilities presented herein are accurate 
only for this particular set of scenarios in this particular airspace controlled by these 
particular ATCOs, even if the sample size issues are disregarded. These probabilities 
should not be used for making real-life operational decisions and are presented here 
as an example of the human reliability analysis that can be produced from real-time 
HITL simulations.
In Figure 3, all 88 simulation runs are plotted, showing scenario complexity 
and number of STCA alarms for each. Blue dots represent simulation runs which 
had only STCAs, whereas red dots show those runs in which loss of separation also 
occurred. ATCOs were not allowed to give additional complexity scores once the 
loss of separation occurred, thus preventing that event from influencing their opin-
ion. Separation minima were 5 NM horizontally and 1000 ft. vertically. Complexity 
scores were calculated as an average of the ATCO’s subjective complexity scores 
made during the peak 20 min of the simulation run [39]. Correlation coefficient 
between these two variables, complexity and number of STCAs, is 0.71, which 
indicates a somewhat strong correlation.
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First thing to notice is that most of the simulator runs, 58 out of 88, finished 
with zero STCAs. Of the remaining 30, only 5 were in medium traffic load sce-
narios, i.e., scenarios with traffic loads equal to current peak traffic. The remaining 
25 were all in high traffic load scenarios which were designed with 15% higher peak 
traffic loads.
Next thing to notice is that, even though the complexity scores are highly 
subjective, it is very rare to have scenarios with complexity higher than 4 and no 
STCAs (only 4 out of 33 or 12%). This indicates that the ATCOs are bunching most 
of the scenarios into the lower half of the scale, perhaps underestimating the actual 
difficulty of managing the traffic situations.
In terms of HRA, it is interesting to calculate the probability that the STCAs 
will be resolved before the loss of separation occurs. Overall probability of human 
error in this case is only 0.155 (11 out of 71) compared to the figure calculated 
by CARA in the example presented in the previous section, which was 0.69. 
Surprisingly, this probability will not change much even if the scenarios were 
filtered by complexity. For example, for scenarios with complexity above 5, the 
probability of an STCA turning into a loss of separation is 0.175 (10 out of 57). For 
scenarios with complexity above 6, the probability is only slightly higher at 0.189 
(7 out of 37). Here, ATCOs obviously show significant compensatory effects which 
should be included into CARA or modelled more precisely by assessors using the 
existing GTTs and EPCs.
On the other hand, the probability that the simulation run will contain at least one 
loss of separation rises sharply with complexity. For the lower half of the complex-
ity scale, this probability is zero. If we consider all scenarios with complexity score 
equal to or above 4, the probability of loss of separation is 0.33 (11 out of 33). For 
scenarios with the score equal to or above 5, the probability is 0.5 (10 out of 20), and 
for scenarios with the complexity score above 6, the probability is 0.538 (7 of 13). This 
shows that even though the probability of an STCA turning into loss of separation is 
lower than expected by CARA, the number of conflicts rises to the level at which the 
loss of separation becomes extremely probable.
As for the Cynefin framework, it could be applied here only in broad brushes. 
One could argue that the first quarter of the complexity scale in these simulations 
Figure 3. 
Number of STCA alarms vs. scenario complexity (red dots represent loss of separation).
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maps to the simple domain because there are no STCAs. Second quarter, with only 
a couple of STCAs which were quickly resolved, perhaps maps to the complicated 
domain. The third quarter could be mapped to the complex domain because there 
are many STCAs, but only two were not resolved in time. Finally, the last quarter 
of the scale arguably maps to the chaotic domain due to high probability of loss of 
separation which indicates that the ATCOs had lost the immediate control of the 
situation. Notwithstanding the Cynefin framework, it is clear that the ATM system 
should be designed to keep the complexity in the lower half of the scale and serious 
efforts are needed to achieve this in the face of the rising traffic demand.
5. Conclusion
In this chapter we have shown how the air traffic complexity, through increas-
ing the difficulty of finding the correct solution to the traffic conflict, influences 
human error probability and, consequently, risk in ATM as well. CARA HRA 
technique was used to show an example of calculation that can be used to assess the 
probability of a loss of separation in traffic situations with low, moderate, and high 
complexity.
Like other HRA techniques, CARA also relies on an expert assessor who must 
be able to correctly model the ATC operations by choosing the appropriate GTTs 
and EPCs. This process is very sensitive to small changes in the initial conditions 
because adding or omitting a single probability calculation often results in an order 
of magnitude different final probabilities. This problem is further exacerbated by 
uncertainty in modelling the ATC operations. For example, it is nearly impossible to 
determine beforehand how many opportunities to resolve a conflict will an ATCO 
have before a loss of separation occurs. In the example shown in Section 4.3, we 
used two attempts before an STCA sounded the alarm and one attempt afterwards. 
If any of those attempts were omitted, the probability of a loss of separation would 
have increased by a significant amount (up to 10 times). Furthermore, different 
ATCOs will use different strategies to solve a conflict, especially if the conflict solu-
tion implies secondary potential conflicts, which makes modelling of ATC opera-
tions in CARA even more difficult. This is not to say that CARA should not be used 
for HRA or as a part of broader risk assessment. It just means that CARA should be 
used with caution and that the results should be considered more as an indication of 
a risk instead of as an exact quantification of risk.
To better illustrate the accuracy of CARA and to show an additional method 
for risk assessment, we have presented a brief analysis of a simulation-based risk 
modelling. During the HITL simulations, which included complexity assessment, 
STCA alarms and loss of separation occurrences were identified and recorded. 
Expectedly, it was shown that the number of STCAs quite strongly correlates with 
the perceived level of air traffic complexity. More interesting was the fact that the 
probability of STCA turning into loss of separation was much smaller than the one 
predicted by CARA. Also, it almost did not change with the increase of complexity 
which indicates presence of strong compensatory effects.
On the other hand, the human error probability for a conflict, defined as a prob-
ability of a failure to solve the conflict resulting in a loss of separation, increases 
with the increase in complexity. Of all 88 simulation runs, zero losses of separation 
occurred in scenarios with complexity below 4 (55 simulation runs). However, 
for simulation scenarios with score above 6, loss of separation occurred in 54% of 
simulation runs. This increase can somewhat be explained by higher traffic loads, 
leading to more conflicts which then led to more occurrences of loss of separation. 
The truth is, however, that the increase in traffic was not such that the number of 
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conflicts should rise to the levels achieved in the simulations. Simulation scenarios 
with high traffic load had only 15% more flights than scenarios with medium traffic 
load. It is the complexity of the traffic situation that precluded the ATCOs from 
being aware of all possible interactions and from solving the conflicts before it was 
too late. Though the sample size in the simulation study was quite small, it is clear 
that the model developed by the assessor in the CARA technique should be adjusted 
to reduce the probability of failing to solve the STCA.
In conclusion, both CARA and simulator study have a place in risk analysis in 
ATM. Best results are achieved when the simulations are performed to gather the 
probabilities of human error in a specific environment and when CARA is used 
to integrate the individual probabilities into a big picture assessment of ATM 
risks. The simulation study showed that the air traffic complexity is not only a 
large source of uncertainty but that it correlates nonlinearly with probability of 
loss of separation. This makes it difficult to model in common HRA techniques, 
with results having large error margins, but the greatest error would be to not 
model it at all.
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Commons Attribution - NonCommercial 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits use, distribution and reproduction for  
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